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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Companies pay taxes on profits and capital. Also, under competitive markets for highly 
skilled labour, firms have to compensate employees for international differences in labour tax 
burdens. Both elements thus constitute a tax burden on companies and influence the attrac-
tiveness of a particular region as a location for investment. The present paper combines the 
two indicators so as to allow for a comprehensive picture of the level of taxation relevant for 
companies at various locations. The synthesis offered here permits a deeper understanding of 
the challenges faced by tax policy in various countries, of the strategies chosen to address 
them, and of the political institutions and economic circumstances determining these choices. 
 
For this purpose, we present and compare estimates of the effective level of taxation in 33 
selected locations across Europe and the United States. For each country, there is both a 
measure of the effective tax burden on profits and capital and a measure for the effective tax 
burden on highly skilled manpower. The computations of effective tax burdens on capital 
investment are based on the model developed by Devereux and Griffith. For the determination 
of effective tax burdens on highly qualified manpower we developed a simulation model that 
accounts for several components of the remuneration package, the family status, and varying 
points in time of taxation. 
 
By combining the two indicators we find that there is great dispersion in the effective tax 
rates of both factors of production. Swiss regions show low tax burdens for both indicators. 
East European and Scandinavian regions display low effective tax rates on capital investment 
but moderate or high effective tax rates on highly qualified manpower. France, Germany, and 
Italy tax companies and highly qualified employees at a high level. The United States display 
moderate tax rates on highly qualified labour and high tax rates on capital investment. 
 
We identify three potential causes in order to explain the different tax policy strategies of dif-
ferent countries: (1) political institutions, (2) preferences for redistribution and equality, and 
(3) the position in globalisation and growth. The first two categories mainly concern the in-
come tax revenue and the tax burden on individuals; the latter category rather concerns the 
tax burden on the mobile factor capital investments. Our findings on the effective tax rate of 
companies and highly skilled manpower strongly reflect these different tax strategies. How-
ever, each country shows a mix of tax strategies which lead to the country-specific tax bur-
dens. Small countries, high growth rates, and federal structure with high tax autonomy stand 
for countries that offer lower tax burdens, especially on companies. As examples for this 
group of countries we can identify e. g. Ireland and Switzerland, however, each with certain 
limitations. Most new EU member states follow a strategy of taxing companies comparatively 
low, but offer only an average tax climate for highly skilled employees. Large countries, rep-
resentative democracies with coalitions, and a high preference for redistribution are likely to 
induce higher tax burdens on both highly qualified employees and companies and thus are 
less attractive locations for an investment from a tax perspective. As typical examples for this 
group of countries, we identify Germany, France, and Italy. The low tax rates for the highly 
skilled in the United States therefore stand for her plurality system, her federal structure, and 
a population with low preference for redistribution. Due to her size the United States do not 
need to tax companies at low rates. 
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Abstract 
Company taxes and taxes on highly skilled labour both influence the attractiveness of a 
particular region as a location for investment. We measure the effective tax burden on ca-
pital investment and on highly qualified labour in 33 locations across Europe and the Uni-
ted States. We then correlate both types of tax burden in order to study the different tax 
policy strategies applied in different countries. We identify three causes for different stra-
tegies: political institutions, preferences for redistribution and equality, and the position 
in globalisation and growth. Small countries, high growth rates, and federal structure with 
high tax autonomy stand for countries with lower tax burdens, especially on companies. 
Large countries, representative democracies with coalitions, and a high preference for re-
distribution are likely to induce higher tax burdens. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Companies pay taxes on profits and capital. Also, under competitive markets for highly 
skilled labour, firms have to compensate employees for international differences in labour tax 
burdens. Both elements thus constitute a tax burden on companies and influence the attrac-
tiveness of a particular region as a location for investment. While there exist numerous studies 
on the tax burden on capital investment on the one hand (see for example, Devereux et al., 
2000, 2001 and European Commission 2002) and several studies on labour taxation on the 
other hand (OECD, 2002 or Sutherland, 2001) there is no study covering and combining both 
aspects of tax burden. The present paper aims at filling this gap so as to allow for a compre-
hensive picture of the level of taxation relevant for companies at various locations. The syn-
thesis offered here permits a deeper understanding of the challenges faced by tax policy in 
various countries, of the strategies chosen to address them, and of the political institutions and 
economic circumstances determining these choices. 
 
For this purpose, we present and compare estimates of the effective level of taxation in sev-
eral European countries and the United States.1 For each country, there is both a measure of 
the effective tax burden on profits and capital and a measure for the effective tax burden on 
highly skilled manpower. Although both indicators rely on different models for estimating 
effective tax burdens, both models share the same spirit. Therefore, we can compare the quali-
tative results of both parts, and we can draw common conclusions. 
 
Due to the great number of relevant tax rules, effective tax burdens may differ significantly 
from statutory tax burdens. Our analysis contributes to theoretical research on taxation by 
providing meaningful quantitative estimates of effective tax burdens. These estimates take 
into account the most important rules of all the relevant taxes. For company taxation, we in-
clude the corporation tax with surcharges, other profit related taxes, real estate taxes, and spe-
cific taxes based on capital. For the taxation of highly skilled manpower, we consider income 
taxes including surcharges, tax-like social security contributions as well as wage taxes paid by 
the company. 
 
In order to quantify and compare effective company tax burdens, we calculate effective aver-
age tax rates (EATRs), which are relevant for international location decisions,2 and effective 
marginal tax rates (EMTRs), which are important indicators for a firm’s investment opportu-
nities and competitiveness from a tax perspective at a given location. The computations are 
based on the model developed by Devereux and Griffith,3 which builds on and extends the 
approach by King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 7-30). Both concepts have already been used for a 
number of international tax burden comparisons.4 
 
                                                 
1 The estimations were prepared for the «IBC BAK International Benchmark Club»®, which evaluates and com-
pares economic performance and location factors across European regions. The headline figures represent the 
IBC Taxation Index (see Table 2 and Table 3). The purpose of the IBC being the benchmarking of location fac-
tors on a regional basis, the project produces effective tax rates for companies in 161 regions in the 18 countries 
studied. In the present paper, we restrict attention to the national level by presenting only the median value for 
the included countries. Additionally, we present regional results for Switzerland, where the inter-regional varia-
tion is most pronounced, and the minimum and maximum corporate tax burden of the included regions in Ger-
many and France. Detailed results can be found in Lammersen and Schwager (2005) and Elschner and Schwager 
(2005). 
2 See Richter et al. (1996), p. 19; Devereux and Griffith (1998); Büttner and Ruf (2004). 
3 See Devereux and Griffith (1999); Devereux and Griffith (2003); Schreiber et al. (2002). 
4 See, e.g., Gutekunst and Schwager (2002), European Commission (2002), Sachverständigenrat (2001) pp. 308-
316, (2003) pp. 354-360; Jacobs et al. (2004). 
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For the measurement of the tax burden on highly skilled manpower, we cannot return to a 
well-established methodology. Existing analyses focus on average production workers, such 
as OECD (2002), or do not consider the tax burden on employees as an issue for the firm, 
such as the Euromod project (Sutherland, 2001). Concerning highly skilled employees, this is 
unsatisfactory since these employees generally receive sophisticated compensation packages 
and are highly mobile.5 To account for the former, an approach has been developed which 
allows to consider several components of the remuneration package, the family status, and 
varying levels of compensation.6 This concept parallels established methodologies for the 
quantification of company tax burdens by calculating the effective average tax rate (EATR) as 
an indicator of the tax burden. Mobility implies that employers compete for highly qualified 
employees and therefore have to compensate them for taxes on labour income and tax-like 
social security contributions. As a consequence, we compare the tax burden of different re-
gions for a given disposable income after taxes which the employee can obtain at all loca-
tions. 
 
For regional and national policy makers, the results of our study can be interesting since taxa-
tion is deemed to be an important location factor. For company taxation, this has been well 
established empirically. Thus, Büttner and Ruf (2004) show that location decisions of German 
multinationals are strongly affected by differentials in statutory as well as effective average 
tax rates. This is in line with De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) who conclude from a survey of 
empirical research that aggregate flows of foreign direct investment are strongly affected by 
taxation. Although less well documented empirically, the tax burden on mobile employees is 
likely to be an important location factor for firms, too. Our study contributes to assess the 
attractiveness of different locations from a tax perspective by comparing effective tax burdens 
inter-regionally and internationally. In particular, the joint consideration on taxes on both 
capital and skilled labour allows evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of locations more 
comprehensively than would be possible by an isolated look at corporate tax rates. 
 
An effective tax rate is always the result of each particular case. To identify the general con-
text and to find out the most relevant tax provisions in different economic constellations - the 
so-called tax drivers - the study examines the effect of important tax provisions on effective 
tax burdens. Thus, an additional benefit of our research consists of improving the understand-
ing of the link between specific legal provisions and the ensuing tax burden. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we first present the estimates on company taxation (Section 2) 
and on the taxation of highly skilled employees (Section 3) separately. In these sections, we 
give a brief account of the models we use and our major results. In Section 4, we combine 
these findings so as to allow for a general discussion of tax policy strategies pursued by the 
countries studied. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 Company Taxation 
 
2.1 The Model 
 
The Devereux/Griffith model considers an incremental, hypothetical corporate investment. 
The investment we assume consists of five different types of assets (intangibles, industrial 
                                                 
5 Winkelmann (2002) and Winkelmann et al. (2001) provide evidence on the extent of international mobility of 
highly skilled employees. 
6 A formal description is provided in Elschner and Schwager (2004). 
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buildings, machinery, financial assets, and inventories). We take three different sources of 
finance into account: retained earnings, new equity, and debt. The hypothetical investment 
takes place in the beginning of a period and generates a return in its end. Thus, we suppose a 
one-period perturbation of the capital stock. We measure the cash flows connected with this 
investment and compute various measures of effective tax rates. Fig. 1 describes the structure 
of the model. 
 
Fig. 1: Structure of the model 
 
 
Before the background of a neoclassical economic framework, the model considers several 
important economic parameters: the unique market interest rate, the rate of inflation, geomet-
rically declining economic depreciation of intangibles, industrial buildings and machinery, 
and the pre-tax rate of return on the investment. In order to isolate the effects of taxation from 
other economic effects, these economic parameters are exogenous, except for the calculation 
of the pre-tax rate of return of a marginal investment. This means that their values are sup-
posed to be equal for all investments regardless of their location. Consequently, real interest 
rates and also nominal interest rates are equal across all the locations and regardless of the 
level of profitability of an investment. In the base case, we assume a corporation in the manu-
facturing sector which undertakes a particular mix of investments and uses a particular com-
bination of sources of finance. Table 1 presents the assumptions of the calculations. 
 
Table 1: Assumption of the calculations 
Assumption on ... Value 
Legal form Corporation 
Industry  Manufacturing Sector 
Assets  Intangibles, industrial buildings, machinery, financial 
assets, inventories (at equal weights) 
Sources of finance Retained earnings (55%), new equity (10%), debt (35%) 
True economic depreciation Intangibles  – 12.5 years 
Industrial buildings  – 53 years 
Machinery – 11 years 
Real interest rate  5% 
Pre-tax real rate of return  
(for calculation of EATR)  20% 
Inflation rate  2% 
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The study focuses on the effective tax burden at the corporate level, which is especially rele-
vant for the choice of location of international corporations.7 Therefore, we include taxes on 
corporate income and capital. The effective tax rates computed for each region comprise taxes 
levied at the national, the state and the municipal level. The calculations consider the statutory 
tax rates of these taxes as well as the interaction of different kinds of taxes and the most im-
portant rules determining the tax base, e.g. differences in depreciation allowances and inven-
tory valuation. 
 
 
2.2 Results 
 
We express the headline results by the EATR, which indicates the effective tax burden on a 
very profitable investment. It is defined as the difference between the pre-tax and the post tax 
rates of return of an investment, divided by the pre-tax rate of return. This measure also repre-
sents the IBC Taxation Index for companies. 
 
The results indicate that there is considerable dispersion of the EATRs between the countries 
and regions considered (see Table 2). The EATRs range from 13.8% in the Swiss canton Zug 
to 37.3% as the maximum tax burden in Germany. Whereas Ireland and Switzerland display 
comparatively low effective tax burdens, locations in France, Germany, and the United States 
show the highest EATRs. This finding suggests that the attractiveness of particular locations 
from a tax perspective differs dramatically, with Switzerland and Ireland as especially attrac-
tive countries. 
 
In 2003, the effective tax burden in the selected new member states of the EU is in compari-
son rather low. Only a few Swiss cantons and Ireland show lower tax burdens in terms of the 
EATR than found for Hungary, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Given amendments and alterations in 
the tax systems, we additionally calculate effective tax burdens of companies for the acces-
sion countries based on the tax rules effective in 2004. Except for the Czech Republic, these 
changes in the tax systems significantly decrease the effective tax burden in these five acces-
sion countries, further improving their attractiveness.    
 
We express a second set of results by the EMTR. In contrast to EATRs, EMTRs indicate the 
effective tax burden on an investment that is marginal in economic sense, i.e. an investment 
that earns a net present value of zero. Such an investment limits the profitable investment 
opportunities of a company. The lower the EMTR at the corporate level, the larger is the theo-
retically optimal level of investment. Also, a firm that faces a lower EMTR on its investment 
is deemed to have a competitive advantage over its competitors who face greater EMTRs. 
 
The dispersion of effective marginal tax rates between the assessed regions is even greater 
than the dispersion of effective average tax rates. It ranges from -11% in Slovenia in the case 
where some special investment incentives fully apply up to 36.2% in Isère, France (see Table 
2). The negative EMTR in the Slovenian incentive case means that the cost of capital is below 
the real interest rate, implying that investment in fact is subsidised in Slovenia. These results 
suggest that the optimal level of investment and the competitiveness of companies located in 
                                                 
7 The non-consideration of taxes at the shareholder level is adequate in case managers do not know the tax posi-
tion of their marginal shareholder. However, domestic shareholder taxation does not affect corporate investment 
decisions of multinationals under substantial international capital mobility. For a discussion of these issues see 
European Commission (2002), p. 142 f., or Spengel (2003), pp. 81–85. The effective tax rates at the combined 
levels of the corporation and the shareholder are reported in Lammersen and Schwager (2004 and 2005). 
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different regions also differ dramatically from a tax perspective. There is also a strong impact 
of targeted measures like investment tax credits or dual income taxes. Therefore, Austrian or 
Slovenian companies that can take full advantage of such measures display very low EMTRs. 
On the other side, there is a disadvantage for companies which have to pay substantial non-
profit taxes. Non-profit taxes weigh especially heavily on investments with a low rate of re-
turn. France, e. g., imposes a comparatively strong non-profit tax in form of the taxe profes-
sionnelle. Consequently, the attractiveness of France as expressed by the EMTR is even lower 
than the one expressed by the EATR. 
 
Statutory profit tax rates are found to be very important tax drivers for profitable investments. 
However, tax burdens always depend on the individual characteristics of each investment, 
thus special rules regarding the tax base or property taxes may be very relevant in particular 
cases. French corporations carry an extra tax burden in form of the taxe professionnelle, 
whereas Italian corporations take advantage of a comparatively favourable definition of the 
corporate tax base. Although the combined statutory profit tax rate in Italy (38.25%) is sig-
nificantly higher than the one in France (35.43%), effective tax burdens are lower in Italy 
than in France.  
 
Sensitivity analyses reveal some interesting mechanics of the impact of taxation on effective 
tax burdens. E.g., the impact of French non-profit taxes heavily depends on the relative im-
portance of fixed assets in the investment mix. French regions significantly improve their 
position compared with German regions when corporations are considered which hardly rely 
on buildings and machinery, as it is the case e.g. in the service sector. However, although 
some notable changes in the rankings occur, these changes are not strong enough to funda-
mentally challenge the main conclusions from the base case. With respect to EMTRs, the im-
pact of the economic assumptions on the ranking is stronger than with respect to EATRs. Par-
ticular tax rules, e.g. the generosity of depreciation allowances, play a more prominent role, 
and the particular features of each individual investment become more important in determin-
ing the most tax efficient location. The weight of the statutory profit tax rate compared with 
the weight of various tax drivers increases along an increasing pre-tax rate of return. 
 
3 Taxation of Highly Skilled Manpower 
 
3.1 The Model 
 
In our approach, we evaluate the tax burden on a highly skilled employee for a given dispos-
able income after taxes. To achieve this, we perform two steps. At first, we conduct the tax 
assessment of a typical qualified employee’s income before taxes (the total remuneration). If 
the resulting income after taxes falls short of (exceeds) the required disposable income, in a 
second step we repeat the assessment for a higher (lower) total remuneration. We then iterate 
until the total remuneration necessary to obtain the predetermined disposable income is found. 
The effective average tax rate then is equal to the difference between total remuneration and 
disposable income (the tax wedge) divided by the total remuneration.  
 
Taxes in this context are all income taxes including surcharges and state and municipality 
taxes, as well as payroll taxes paid by the company. Social security contributions are part of 
the tax burden inasmuch as the employee does not earn a specific, individual benefit by pay-
ing them. According to the basic idea of competition, there is little risk of unemployment for 
the kind of qualified employees considered in this study. Hence we define contributions to 
unemployment insurance, and by a similar reasoning also contributions to accident insurance, 
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as taxes. On the other hand, we consider health insurance contributions not to be taxes since 
they are deemed to provide a genuine insurance. 
 
Contributions to public pension schemes qualify partly as taxes. The first pillar of old-age 
insurance is usually organised as a pay as you go system involving redistribution between 
generations and between high and low earning workers. Inasmuch contribution payments do 
not result in actual fair pension entitlements, they constitute an implicit tax rather than an in-
surance premium. To account for this implicit tax, we compute entitlements earned by the 
highly qualified employee according to the legislation currently in force and offset against 
contributions. 
 
Our model distinguishes between three kinds of compensation: (1) cash compensation, (2) 
contributions to old-age provisions, and (3) benefits in kind. These components are taxable in 
different periods. Cash compensation and benefits in kind are taxable income in the year of 
payment. Contributions to old-age provisions are either excluded from taxable income and 
thus pension benefits are subject to taxation, or contributions are paid out of taxed income 
implying that pensions are non-taxable income during retirement. Our model explicitly deals 
with the timing of tax and pension payments by using an inter-temporal approach. 
 
3.2 Results 
 
The base case represents the IBC Taxation Index for highly skilled manpower. Here, we con-
sider an employee demanding a disposable income of € 100,000. The total remuneration paid 
by the employer in order to meet the employee’s demand consists of 75% cash compensation, 
20% old-age contributions, and 5% benefits in kind. The employee is single and has no other 
income. The resulting effective tax burdens form four groups (see Table 3): The first group is 
with the Swiss cantons Schwyz, Zug, and Nidwalden reveal the lowest tax burdens of less 
than 30%. The second group with moderate tax burdens between 30% and 40% consists of 
the other cantons analysed, the United States, Poland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. 
High tax burdens with effective tax rates between 40% and 50% occur in Ireland, Slovakia, 
Austria, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, France, and Italy. Slovenia, 
Sweden, Belgium, and Finland display the highest effective tax rates with more than 50%. 
 
To illustrate these differences, it is instructive to translate back the EATRs into the total re-
muneration required in each location so as to provide the employee with a disposable income 
of € 100,000. To achieve this, a company has to spend € 134,574 in Schwyz, € 161,740 in 
Massachusetts, and € 230,415 in Finland. Thus, taxes interfere heavily in the international 
competition for talent. 
 
The most important tax drivers influencing the effective tax rates on highly skilled labour are 
the top tax rate of the personal income tax and the amount of charges paid within the contri-
butions to social security. 
 
Regarding the top tax rates (including state/cantonal income taxes and surcharges), the Swiss 
cantons Zug, Schwyz, and Nidwalden again form a group with the lowest top tax rate. They 
display top tax rates (including cantonal and municipal income taxes) of less than 30%. The 
second group with top tax rates between 30% and 40% is formed by the Czech Republic, the 
Swiss Canton of St. Gall, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. Top tax rate of at least 50% apply in 
Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden. The remaining 
countries levy taxes of between 40% and 50% at the top.  
 
 8  
This ranking is widely reflected in the effective tax rates. However, the corresponding in-
comes from which on the top tax rates apply also are an important factor. In the Czech Repub-
lic and in Hungary, tax payers with incomes of € 10,000 and of € 5,000, respectively, already 
achieve the top tax rates of 32% and 40%. Despite comparably low tax rates, those two coun-
tries find themselves in the last third in the ranking. Austria and the Netherlands with top tax 
rates of 50% and more display lower EATRs due to a higher progressivity in their tax tables 
and capped social security contributions. Especially for the United States and Switzerland, 
where the top tax rates often apply only for incomes exceeding € 200,000 and more, the 
EATRs for a disposable income of € 100,000 are far below the top tax rates. 
 
Regarding the charges payable on a highly qualified employee’s income, the most important 
impact is the existence or absence of income ceilings from which on no further social security 
contributions are payable. Only in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slova-
kia, and the United States income ceilings exist for all branches of social security for both the 
employee and the employer. In particular, a low ceiling of € 9,300 applies in Slovakia; the 
Netherlands have ceilings of around € 30,000. However, the contribution rates are compara-
bly high with more than 40% of gross income. Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, and Slovenia do not apply any income ceiling for social insurance contributions. So, 
the total contribution rate is payable on all income. While Switzerland therefore has a compa-
rably low total contribution rate of less than 15% Slovenia and Belgium levy contributions at 
rates of around 40%. This results in high EATRs for Slovenia and Belgium. Combined with 
high top tax rates, the EATRs amount to over 50%. Belgium is on the second-to-last rank; 
Slovenia ranks fourth-to-last.  
 
The model allows evaluating the effects of a large number of different economic and personal 
circumstances. For example, all regions grant tax relief for families in the form of child bene-
fits or special tax schedules depending on marital status and the number of children. The re-
sults of the model show that families in Germany, Ireland, the USA, France, and Switzerland 
enjoy a particularly strong reduction of their tax burden relative to singles (see Elschner and 
Schwager, 2004 and 2005).  
 
While any variation obviously affects the calculated EATRs, sensitivity analyses show that 
the ranking of EATRs is quite robust to changes in specific assumptions of the model. In all 
cases Zug, Schwyz, and Nidwalden have the lowest tax rates, usually followed by the remain-
ing Swiss cantons, the United States, Poland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. Slove-
nia, Sweden, Belgium, and Finland change ranks among each other but most of the time re-
main at the high end of the scale. The new EU Member States are not inevitably attractive 
countries from the tax perspective if one looks at the taxation of highly qualified employees. 
In contrast to the tax burden on companies they rather show a moderate or even high tax bur-
den on skilled manpower. 
 
4 Tax Policy Strategies: Explanations and Implications 
 
In this section, we provide a synthesis of the findings about the effective tax burdens of both 
companies and highly skilled manpower. In the first subsection, we aim at identifying tax 
policy strategies pursued by the countries analysed. In the second subsection, we discuss sev-
eral hypotheses which might explain the diversity found among these strategies. While this 
discussion necessarily remains speculative without a thorough empirical analysis, it will nev-
ertheless present some insights into the political motives and economic circumstances which 
may have caused the levels of taxation found in our study. This is important since any policy 
advice to be derived from our figures should take into account the likely political aims and the 
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special situation of each country. The discussion of political implications is the purpose of the 
final subsection. 
 
 
4.1 A synthesis of both indicators 
 
Fig. 2 provides a synthesis of the two indicators for the effective tax burden of companies and 
on highly qualified employees. For five Swiss cantons and the other countries, this figure dis-
plays the EATR at the corporate level together with the EATR of a single-earner employee 
obtaining a disposable income of € 100,000 in 2003. Due to a number of conceptual differ-
ences, we cannot compare the absolute values of the IBC Taxation Indexes for companies and 
for highly qualified employees. Especially, both concepts of effective tax burdens do not per-
mit straightforward conclusions on distributional issues. Nevertheless, we can compare the 
rankings and the relative differences in effective tax burdens between both indicators.  
 
For this purpose, we index the effective tax burdens of all countries and the Swiss cantons 
relative to the average of the included Swiss cantons and the other countries. A canton or 
country with an index number 100 for the taxation of companies (highly skilled employees) 
thus has an EATR for companies (highly skilled employees) which equals the average of all 
cantons and countries considered. The vertical (horizontal) distance between an observation 
and the axes shows how much lower or higher a location’s effective tax burden is compared 
to the average in the case of companies (manpower).  
 
It is striking that effective tax burdens appear to be closely correlated for a number of loca-
tions. Especially for Swiss cantons, we find a low level of effective tax burdens of companies 
and a low tax burden on highly skilled workers. Other regions that impose large corporate tax 
burdens also impose large tax burdens on comparatively high personal incomes, especially 
Germany, France, and Italy. Thus, the Swiss cantons follow a clear low tax strategy with re-
spect to both companies and highly skilled manpower while the other three countries men-
tioned can be characterized as high-tax countries in both respects. Also Austria, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, Luxemburg, and Poland display a point on or somewhat above a 
hypothetical diagonal in Figure 2, indicating a similar ranking in both indicators. The level of 
taxation is at an intermediate level in both respects for these countries. 
 
There is a group of countries which tax highly qualified employees quite heavily while taxing 
companies only moderately. Especially Hungary and Slovenia have low tax burdens for com-
panies but highly skilled employees suffer a comparatively high tax burden there. This holds 
also for Sweden and Finland, which both have dual income tax systems with low tax rates on 
capital and high tax rates on employment income. Although less clear cut, also Belgium and, 
with a lower overall level of tax burden, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, can be associated 
to this group. The most pronounced example for this group obviously is Ireland, which almost 
matches the most favourable Swiss location in terms of company tax burden while imposing 
an effective tax rate on skilled manpower which is close to the mean of the regions consid-
ered. The tax policy strategy chosen by these countries apparently consists of selectively re-
ducing the tax burden on companies while keeping labour income taxation at relatively high 
levels. 
 
Finally, the United States (Massachusetts) differs remarkably from all other countries ana-
lysed. There, the tax burden on companies is among the highest of all regions considered, 
while qualified employees are taxed quite moderately. Thus, the strategy of the United States 
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consists of very moderate taxation of high earners combined with a substantial tax on com-
pany income. 
 
 
4.2 Why do countries choose different tax policy strategies? 
 
We group the potential determinants of the tax policies chosen by different countries into 
three categories. The first two of these, political institutions and preferences for redistribution 
and equality, essentially determine the amount of government revenues required. The third 
category, position in the processes of globalisation and growth, mainly explains strategies in 
company taxation. 
 
Institutions. 
Given the remarkably low effective tax rates in Switzerland, it is natural to think of direct 
democracy as an important institutional determinant of the tax burden. There is indeed an 
ample body of research analysing tax policy in Swiss cantons and municipalities which con-
firms this hypothesis. For example, Feld and Matsusaka (2003) and Feld and Kirchgässner 
(2001) show that localities with referenda on tax policy have lower levels of government 
spending and taxation compared to those in which parliament decides alone. 
 
In representative democracies, the electoral system may have an impact on the overall tax 
burden. In countries with proportional representation, coalition governments are common, 
while in countries with a plurality system, typically one winning party alone forms a govern-
ment. Since in a coalition more special interests are represented, it is harder for such a gov-
ernment to reduce spending since they have to please all those interests. Thus taxes are likely 
to remain high (see Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2001, Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002, and Stega-
rescu, 2005). A similar effect may be at work in countries with a bicameral or presidential 
system where law making effectively needs the consensus of both major political camps. The 
high effective tax rates in Germany, Italy, and France fit this explanation. Conversely, the fact 
that the United Kingdom taxes more moderately may be attributed to the generally clear ma-
jority of the ruling party in Britain’s Lower House. 
 
A further characteristic distinguishing Switzerland from most of the other countries is her 
federal structure and the strong tax autonomy enjoyed by jurisdictions at the subnational 
level. Since Swiss cantons and municipalities experience tax competition even inside their 
own country, they have a stronger incentive to keep tax burdens on mobile capital low than a 
unitary state where such internal tax competition is absent. As shown by recent theoretical 
(Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002) and empirical (Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé, 2001) research, 
however, the joint exploitation of the same tax base by several layers of the state induces ex-
cessively high tax rates in federations. A similar effect occurs when local jurisdictions par-
ticipate in a system of equalizing grants (see Bucovetsky and Smart, 2002, Büttner and 
Schwager, 2003). Despite the unquestionable relevance of tax competition on the municipal 
level, Germany has exceptionally high effective tax burdens on companies.  
 
Preferences for redistribution. 
Alesina et al. (2001) discuss the causes for the different extent of the welfare state in the 
United States and Europe. Based on many indicators, they show that the majority of the popu-
lation in the United States are much less inclined to support the poor and to redistribute in-
come via the public budget than the electorate in most European countries. By consequence, 
the higher overall level of taxation in most continental European countries may simply reflect 
the citizens’ stronger taste for redistribution. In that respect, the two English speaking Euro-
 11  
pean nations in our sample, the United Kingdom and Ireland, seem to be closer to the United 
States than to Europe. 
 
Similar to a revenue requirement deriving from flaws in the electoral system, also the revenue 
requirement originating from a desire to redistribute income mainly explains the tax burden 
on employees. Nevertheless, the tax burden on capital may in itself be considered an issue for 
social justice, in the sense that equity requires to tax capital at least as heavily as labour in-
come. If this is the case, a high effective tax rate for companies follows from a strong demand 
for redistribution alongside a high tax burden on qualified labour. 
 
Globalisation and growth. 
The position of a country in the growth process may be important for her choice of tax strat-
egy since it affects the benefits and costs of taxing capital for redistributive reasons. Whereas 
the countries in our sample belonging to the EU 15, with the exception of Ireland, are charac-
terized by a high GDP per capita and low growth rates, the accession countries are fast grow-
ing, but starting from a very low level. By consequence, in the EU accession countries there is 
very little capital which could be expropriated by taxation, implying that it is not really 
worthwhile to impose high corporate income taxes. Contrary to that, company taxation in the 
EU 15 countries generally promises substantial revenue and thus a high effective tax rate on 
companies is attractive. 
 
The cost of redistributing income by capital taxation is also closely linked to a country’s 
growth rate. It is likely that in relatively poor countries, a high effective marginal tax rate on 
investment is particularly harmful in terms of foregone growth since the potential for growth 
is still large in such countries. It is striking that in our sample, the Eastern European countries 
typically choose a strategy of low or very low company taxation, combined with a relatively 
high tax on skilled employees. In 2004 this strategy of the enlargement countries is confirmed 
by a further significant decrease of the company tax burden in Poland and the Slovakia. Thus, 
while these societies seem to adhere to the continental European model of the welfare state, 
they are not ready to jeopardize their growth prospects by taxing corporate investment heav-
ily. An observation confirming this conclusion is the prevalence of specific investment incen-
tives e.g. in Slovenia and the Czech Republic which particularly reduce EMTRs, the measure 
of tax burden relevant for the level of investment. 
 
All countries are exposed to globalisation, but not all are so to the same degree. According to 
international trade theory, small countries generally benefit from international trade and factor 
movements and thus are more open than large countries. Consequently, small countries 
should be more aware of tax induced international relocation of capital than large countries. 
Since EATRs are relevant for location decisions, this fact implies that we should expect small 
open countries to display comparatively low EATRs, whereas large countries are more likely 
to stick to high EATRs despite globalisation. The results are largely in line with this hypothe-
sis. The big European countries Germany, France, and Italy impose high effective tax burdens 
on companies while smaller countries like Switzerland, Ireland, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Finland, Luxemburg, and Belgium display lower company tax burdens. This is particularly 
remarkable in the cases of Belgium and the two Scandinavian countries which definitely do 
not follow a general low tax – low spending strategy. Instead, these countries keep personal 
income taxes high so as to finance the desired amount of expenditure, but they explicitly want 
to attract internationally mobile firms by reducing company tax burdens, for example by a 
dual income tax regime. The most striking example here is probably the United States. De-
spite a culture of low state involvement and low taxes, the US tops the list of effective aver-
age tax rates on companies. A possible explanation for this fact is that the US is so large that 
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an international relocation of production is relevant for only a small fraction of her compa-
nies. By consequence, the pressure to keep profit taxes low is felt much less intensely than in 
other countries. 
 
There is yet another possible interpretation of the strategy pursued by the USA, France, Ger-
many, and Italy in the process of globalisation. Since companies do not only pay taxes but 
also benefit from public infrastructure, it might be that these countries try to position them-
selves as suppliers of high value public goods which are worth the high price in terms of 
taxes. Compared with the Eastern European countries, the superior infrastructure in these 
countries certainly compensates to some extent for the tax differential. However, Switzerland, 
the Scandinavians, and Luxemburg are able to offer a similar package of public services to-
gether with lower tax rates, not to mention Ireland. Thus, the benefit provided by high taxes 
can at best explain a small part of the difference in EATRs measured. 
 
 
4.3 Policy Implications 
 
For Germany, the results of our study bear the clear message that, despite recent reforms, ef-
fective tax rates are still high in comparison with other countries. Inasmuch as high taxes are 
considered to be harmful for growth, Germany should reinforce her efforts in reducing the 
overall tax burden, especially for companies. However, the above discussion suggests that a 
majority of the German population may be willing to accept lower growth as a price to be 
paid for social justice. In particular, the Nordic and Eastern European strategy of selectively 
reducing corporate income taxes is inconsistent with the ideas of distributional justice held by 
some commentators in Germany (Kirchhof, 2002). 
 
It is possible, however, that a consensus is about to emerge in Germany to accept lower public 
spending so as to be able to reduce tax burdens. If this is the case, institutional reforms may 
be helpful to promote a tax-reducing agenda. The collusive behaviour of state and federal 
governments in deciding tax policy may be a major cause for persistently high taxes (cf. 
Blankart, 2000). By consequence, a more decentralised allocation of powers to legislate taxes, 
with some tax autonomy on the part of the Länder, might help to reduce effective tax rates in 
Germany. The Swiss example furthermore suggests that referenda on fiscal issues could be a 
way of curbing government spending and reducing tax rates.  
 
For the European Union, the policy conclusions are different. On average, Europe does not 
suffer from poor growth, implying that an overall reduction in tax rates is probably not the top 
priority. On the other hand, the strong dispersion in EATRs across EU countries may cause 
firms to choose locations according to tax differentials rather than according to productivity 
(see Devereux et al., 2003). The ensuing inefficiency will be reduced by a co-ordinated tax 
base.  
 
Several caveats are appropriate here, however. First, as shown by Sørensen (2004), a har-
monisation of capital income taxes restricted to the European Union is likely to provide only 
moderate welfare gains. Second, harmonisation of taxes may be harmful if it allows self-
interested politicians to extract political rents from the citizens (see Edwards and Keen 1996). 
Given that in the EU, decision procedures are certainly not closer to the individual citizens 
than in the member states, a transfer of taxing power to the European Union should be han-
dled with care. 
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Finally, low corporate income taxes appear to be an integral part of the growth strategy of the 
new member states. It would be short-sighted to take this instrument away from these coun-
tries. If forced to raise their tax rates, they probably will react by intensifying competition in 
other location factors such as labour market or environmental regulation. Most importantly, 
because of intensified trade and reduced regional aid, the EU 15 countries will probably bene-
fit more from dynamic growth in the recent member states than they lose through tax induced 
relocation of companies. 
 
 
5 Summary and Conclusions  
 
Under competitive markets for capital and highly skilled manpower, company taxes and taxes 
on highly skilled labour both influence the attractiveness of a particular region as a location 
for investment. By measuring the effective tax burden on capital investment and on highly 
qualified labour for 33 selected locations across Europe and the United States, we find that 
there is great dispersion in the effective tax rates of both factors of production. Based on that 
analysis, the aim of this paper is to combine these findings and to study the correlation of both 
types of tax burden. By doing so, we obtain a more complete picture of tax policy strategies 
pursued by the countries studied. 
 
We identify three potential causes in order to explain the different tax policy strategies of dif-
ferent countries: (1) political institutions, (2) preferences for redistribution and equality, and 
(3) the position in globalisation and growth. Our findings on the effective tax rate of compa-
nies and highly skilled manpower strongly reflect these different tax strategies. However, 
each country shows a mix of tax strategies which lead to the country-specific tax burdens. 
Small countries, high growth rates, and federal structure with high tax autonomy stand for 
countries that offer lower tax burdens, especially on companies. As examples for this group of 
countries we can identify e. g. Ireland and Switzerland, however, each with certain limita-
tions. Most new EU member states follow a strategy of taxing companies comparatively low, 
but offer only an average tax climate for highly skilled employees. Large countries, represen-
tative democracies with coalition governments, and a high preference for redistribution are 
likely to induce higher tax burdens on both highly qualified employees and companies and 
thus are less attractive locations for an investment from a tax perspective. As typical examples 
for this group of countries, we identify Germany, France, and Italy. The low tax rates for the 
highly skilled in the United States therefore stand for her plurality system, her federal struc-
ture, and a population with low preference for redistribution. Due to her size the United States 
do not need to tax companies at low rates. 
 
Future research aims at further examining, and substantiating, these conclusions. As an exam-
ple for such an extension, an analysis of the taxation of highly qualified expatriate staff might 
be of interest. Indeed, the growing number of countries offering special tax regimes for such 
employees supports the hypothesis that many countries pursue a strategy to tax mobile factors 
low and immobile factors high. With an increasing number of international assignments, the 
potential impact of these special tax regimes on the investment decisions of companies offers 
a promising field for future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Company Taxation: Effective Average Tax Rates (EATR) and Effective Mar-
ginal Tax Rate (EMTR) at the Corporate Level, 2003 
 EATR (%) 
IBC Taxation Index on Companies 
EMTR (%) 
CH-Zug 13.8 7.1 
Ireland  14.0 11.9 
CH-Nidwalden 15.4 9.0 
CH-Schwyz 16.5 10.6 
CH-Ticino 18.5 12.2 
CH-Bern 18.6 10.6 
Hungary 19.4 18.9 
CH-Valais 19.7 14.7 
CH-St. Gallen 20.3 6.9 
CH-Vaud 20.5 13.1 
Slovenia 20.8 10.0 
CH-Zurich 21.0 13.6 
Slovakia  21.3 12.0 
CH-Geneva 21.4 14.5 
CH-Basel 22.1 15.6 
Sweden  22.5 15.1 
CH-Basel Landschaft 22.8 16.3 
Czech Republic  23.5 17.4 
Poland  23.7 16.1 
Luxembourg  25.8 14.7 
Finland 26.5 21.2 
United Kingdom 28.1 24.2 
Belgium 28.7 16.3 
Netherlands 30.2 21.1 
Austria 30.4 22.9 
Italy  31.8 18.9 
France Min. (Paris) 32.1 25.5 
Germany Min.(Weilheim) 32.9 23.6 
France Med. (Doubs) 34.5 32.9 
Germany Med. (Heilbronn) 34.8 25.7 
France Max. (Isère) 35.7 36.2 
United States 36.0 25.8 
Germany Max. (Frankfurt) 37.3 28.4 
Source: ZEW/BAK. 
Remarks: CH = Switzerland. For Austrian corporations that can take maximum advantage of the dual income tax system and 
the incremental investment tax credit, the EATR reduces to 26.1 per cent and the EMTR reduces to 3.3 per cent. 
For Luxembourgian companies, which can use the tax credit for supplementary investment, the EATR is 23.6% 
and the EATR is reduced to 4.5% , and for Slovenian companies, which can take full advantage of the investment 
tax credit and the tax exempt reserve, the EATR is reduced to 15% and the EMTR is -11%.  
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Table 3: Effective average tax rates on highly qualified manpower, 2003 
Single employee 
IBC Taxation Index on Highly Skilled Manpower 
Married employee with two children 
  EATR in %   EATR in % 
CH Schwyz 25.7 CH Zug 20.9 
CH Zug  25.9 CH Schwyz 22.0 
CH Nidwalden 28.3 CH Nidwalden 25.0 
CH Zurich 32.6 Luxembourg 26.0 
CH Valais 35.4 CH Zurich 26.7 
CH Basel Landschaft 36.6 CH St. Gallen 30.2 
CH St. Gallen 36.8 United States 31.3 
CH Bern 36.8 CH Basel Landschaft 31.3 
CH Basel 36.9 CH Vaud 31.4 
CH Geneva 37.9 CH Valais 31.5 
CH Ticino 38.2 CH Bern 31.9 
United States  38.2 CH Ticino 32.0 
Poland  38.6 CH Basel 32.1 
Luxembourg  39.2 CH Geneva 33.9 
United Kingdom  39.2 Germany 35.2 
CH Vaud 39.3 Ireland 35.8 
Ireland  40.3 Poland 36.8 
Slovakia  40.7 United Kingdom 37.4 
Austria  41.7 Austria 38.2 
Netherlands  42.9 France 39.4 
Czech Republic  43.6 Netherlands 40.2 
Hungary  45.2 Slovak Republic 40.4 
France  47.3 Czech Republic 43.2 
Germany  47.6 Hungary 44.9 
Italy  49.8 Italy 49.2 
Slovenia  51.2 Belgium 50.3 
Sweden  51.8 Slovenia 50.5 
Belgium  54.0 Sweden 51.1 
Finland  56.6 Finland  55.4 
Remarks: The disposable income of € 100,000 is calculated with a compensation package of 75 per cent cash, 5 
per cent benefits in kind, and 20 per cent old-age contributions. Source: ZEW/BAK. 
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Fig. 2: Correlation of Company Tax Burdens and Tax Burdens on Highly Skilled (2003). 
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Effective tax 
burden on … 
BE BS SZ ZG ZH CH A B CZ D F 
highly skilled 
manpower 
90.7 90.9 63.2 63.7 80.1 88.8 102.6 132.9 107.3 117.2 116.3 
companies  78.8 93.8 70.1 58.6 89.4 84.1 129.2 121.9 99.8 148 146.5 
 
Effective tax 
burden on … 
FIN GB H I IRL L NL PL S SK SLO USA  
highly skilled 
manpower 
139.3 96.5 111.3 122.5 99.2 96.5 105.6 95 127.5 100.2 126 94 
companies  112.6 119.4 82.4 135.1 59.5 109.6 128.5 100.7 95.6 90.5 88.4 152.9 
Remarks: BE = Bern, BS = Basel, SZ = Schwyz, ZG = Zug, ZH = Zurich, CH= average of 7 additional Swiss Cantons;  A = 
Austria; B = Belgium; CZ = Czech Republic; D = Germany; F = France; FIN = Finland; GB = United Kingdom; 
H = Hungary; I = Italy; IR = Ireland; NL = the Netherlands; PL = Poland; S = Sweden; SK = Slovakia; SLO = Slo-
venia; US = United States. With the exception of Switzerland, we have chosen the median value for those countries 
that demonstrate regional variation in company tax burdens.  Source: ZEW/BAK. 
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